This article describes my impressions of the full 9/11
commission report. My intention was to highlight important points made in the
report, and to provide my analysis and impressions of the government failures,
al Qaeda’s operation, and the Commission’s recommendations. I’ve attempted to
cite page numbers of most of the facts I’ve used in this report. Page numbers
refer to the paperback version of the report. Your mileage may vary if you are
looking at the hardcover or PDF versions.
The 9/11 Commission’s Final report focused on six themes.
Chapters 1 and 9 focus on the events of 9/11. Chapter 1 focuses mostly on the hijackings and crashes, while chapter 9 focuses on the emergency services response to the WTC and Pentagon attack. The final timeline of events answers several questions that I’ve had since the morning of 9/11, including the reports of a fifth place (there was confusion surrounding American 11, some in NORAD/FAA thought it was heading to the DC area, even after it impacted into the north tower). If you read no other parts of the report, I recommend reading chapters 1 & 9.
While I can hardly call it the
Federal Government or
During the period of 1990-2000, the
The first unfortunate aspect of the
American responses were mostly ineffectual prior to 9/11. In
1983 Regan pulled the troops out of
The report goes into the
organization structure of the FBI – the agency primarily thought of when
fighting terror. The FBI operates under the “office of origin” (p74) system
where all investigations are driven from the field offices, not from
Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 the FBI was tasked with performing domestic counterintelligence. However counterintelligence and criminal investigations often used different tools. The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) limited how warrants obtained in the pursuit of intelligence investigations could be used in criminal cases. This led to the formation of “a wall” at the FBI[1]. For information to pass between the criminal side and the intelligence side, it had to be approved by the DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). The report shows how several times this extra layer of bureaucracy prevented investigators from putting together the pieces and getting an idea of the hijacker’s plans. One FBI Deputy Director went so far as to say “too much information sharing could be a career stopper” (p79).
Within the FAA, the focus was more on sabotage then on hijacking. The Gore Commission’s report on aviation security didn’t even mention the possibility of suicide hijackings (p83). Prior to 9/11 the FAA did have a no-fly list, but it only contained 12 names. It did not reference any lists from CIA, FBI or the State Dept. Finally the FAA approved and disseminated what is known as the “Common Strategy”. It taught compliance with hijacker’s demands, get the plane on the ground, and let law enforcement or the military handle the problem”. As the report notes (p85) reinforced cockpit doors would have done little good. One pilot said: “Even if you make a vault out of the door, if they have a noose around my flight attendant’s neck I’m going to open the door”.
The report does give credit the DOD and the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986. It restructured the military into the regional commands (like CentCom) and restructured the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The heads of the different branches are responsible for training and equipping their troops, while the regional commanders are responsible for directing operations in their fields. This has led to a much closer working relationship between the 4 branches of the Armed Forces.
·
Usama bin Ladin (UBL) – his career began in the
struggle against the Soviet invasion of
In late 1998 KSM formally joined
al Qaeda. Shortly there after UBL approved what became known as the “planes
operation”. KSM’s original plans called for 10 planes, all the 9/11 targets
plus nuclear power plants and tall buildings in
January 2000 – Hazmi & Mihdhar
arrive in LA. They decide that they don’t like LA and move to
They were sent to the
In summer of 2002 Atta, Shehhi and
Jarrah arrived in the
Over the holidays the Hamburg
Three left the country again, returning in early January. While they were gone
they met with KSM in
Twelve of the 13 muscle hijackers
were Saudis, the other was from UAE(p231). In interrogations KSM said that the
Saudis were picked because they comprised 70% of the al Qaeda recruits (20%
being Yemeni) and they had an easier time getting a visa. The muscle hijackers began
arriving in the
Al Qaeda spent only about $400,000 - $500,000 on the 9/11 plot (p169); however it has a $30 million annual budget. Much of the money was raised by donations and siphoned off from Islamic NGOs. About two thirds of al Qaeda’s expenditures were to the Taliban for safe haven. Most of UBL’s personal assets were confiscated by the Saudis and therefore UBL didn’t fund much of al Qaeda via his personal wealth (p170). He did not make much money off of narco-trafficking, conflict diamonds or the manipulation of the stock market prior to 9/11 (p171).
While UBL and KSM had their acts together, the terrorists selected for the attack were flakes. Since travel was such a security issue for al Qaeda, their frequent trips home were unprofessional. Had the US put together a real terror watch list, and had INS not been asleep at the switch, one or more of the pilots could have been caught and possible given up the 9/11 plot.
The CIA had numerous plans to use
Afghan rebels and the
Several of the 9/11 hijackers had
connections to KSM, who in turn had connections to those believed responsible
for the USS Cole bombing. At various points Mihdar and Hazmi traveled to
The Counterterrorism Security
Group, headed by Richard Clarke, was the White House office responsible for
coordinating counter-terror policy. There was lack of direction from the CSG on
how to respond to foreign threats to domestic targets (p264). A
The change in administrations
didn’t change things substantially. Clarke was kept on as head of the CSG,
although he no longer reported directly to the cabinet secretaries but to their
deputies. He took this to be a demotion. Much of
The report says that while the
Sudanese defense minister claimed to have offered up UBL to the
From 1998 onwards the State Dept.
tried to get the Taliban to get rid of UBL or turn him over to the
It also tried to get
The
Chapter 8
of the report describes the intelligence received during the summer of 2001.
While the volume of reports was high, very few indicated that hijackers would
try and capture planes and hit major landmarks inside the
By late July the spike in intelligence stopped (p260).
Response to these unspecific
reports included moving visa applications from the
The commission concluded: “Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it. Despite their large number, the threats received contained few specifics regarding time, place, method, or target. Most suggested that attacks were planned against targets overseas; others indicated threats against unspecified “US Interests”. We cannot say for certain whether these reposts, as dramatic as they were, related to the 9/11 attacks” (p262).
In mid-August 2001, the FBI was
turned on to a jihadist named Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui was in
We knew
that UBL wanted to kill Americans based on his 1998 fatwa (47). However all
previous terror attacks never generated enough outrage and interest among the
general public to become primary policy concerns.
Neither the
Clinton nor the Bush Administrations ever responded to the attack on the USS
Cole.
To have
effectively gotten rid of bin Laden would have required putting American troops
in harm’s way. Based on the legacies of Desert One, Black Hawk down and to some
extent even
The commission makes several recommendations in the last two chapters of the book. They are broadly broken down into what to do, and how to organize the government to do it. I’ll only cover the highlights of the recommendations.
One telling recommendation went
after the Cold War notion of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. They said: “Where Muslim governments, even those who
are friends, do not respect these principles [individual opportunity,
economic freedom, the rule of law, and political openness], the
“Recommendation: A comprehensive US strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future” (p379). There is a direct correlation between economic prosperity and economic and cultural freedom. Only by building self sustaining economies can these people move beyond violence and join the civilized world.
While I can agree with the
commission’s foreign policy recommendations, their recommendations with regard
to domestic security are somewhat suspect. I can accept a biometric screening
system for foreign nationals (389); however their recommendations with regard
to identity documents (390) sound like a national ID system. While for border
security this is not too big a concern, the creeping reach of government
programs means it will eventually be used for tracking citizen’s movements
within the
The commission does take on congress when talking about Homeland Security funding assistance, saying “it should supplement state a local resources based on the risks and vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel” (p396).
On the organizational front the
commission recommends the creation of a
They also recommend the creation of a National Intelligence Director. This person will take on some of the duties of the DCI, such as “leading the intelligence community” and acting as the President’s “analyst in chief”. Currently the DCI acts in three roles, the two mentioned above, and as a cabinet level principal of a major agency. In addition the DCI is given no authority over the various intelligence agency’s budgets, limiting his ability to lead the intelligence community (p411).
Finally the commission recommends that the congress create a single oversight committee for all intelligence (p421).
[1] This wall was formalized in 1995 by AG Reno. Commission member Jamie Gorelick (then Deputy AG) was responsible for chairing the working group that formalized the procedures. According to the Commission’s report, Gorelick rescued herself from this part of the report.